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CaseNo.20071008-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Brenda Christine White,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an interlocutory appeal from a pretrial order denying Defendant's
motion for a jury instruction on extreme emotional distress in her trial for attempted
murder and criminal mischief. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §
78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Based on the evidence presented and proffered in this attempted murder case,
must the trial court instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
distress?
Standard ofReview. "Whether a trial court committed error in refusing to give
a requested jury instruction is a question of law, which [the reviewing court will]
review for correctness." State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f 11,6 P.3d 1116,1118 (2000).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4) (West 2004):
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted
murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to
cause the death of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse; or
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a
legal justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was
not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not
include:
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section
76-2-305; or
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own
conduct.
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under
Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actor under
Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Domestic Violence Information dated 28 April
2006 with attempted murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-5203 (2006), and criminal mischief, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
§ 76-6-106 (2006). R. 1-2.

The information was later amended.

R. 241-43

(Addendum A). She was bound over after a preliminary hearing. R. 239-40.

2

Defendant filed a motion in limine seeking a "pre-trial order authorizing the
defense of Extreme Emotional Distress to be presented as a question of fact to the
jury/' R. 433. The court denied the motion, ruling that "[t]he information that
Defendant White has proffered does not constitute evidence of extreme emotional
distress, and there is irrelevant to that defense and may not be presented as
evidence of extreme emotional distress." R. 651, 653 (Addendum B).
Defendant filed a petition for interlocutory review. R. 664-694. The Utah
Supreme Court granted the petition and transferred the case to this Court. R. 697.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
"I'm going to wipe you off this earth"
Preliminary hearing facts. Defendant was married to Jon White for eleven
years. R. 711: 25-26. The marriage was "a rocky ride from the beginning." R. 711:
66. Jon's mindset was, "I [can] make this work/7 Id. The birth of their first child did
not, as he expected, solidify the marriage; instead, divorce became a frequent topic
of discussion in their home. R. 711: 66-67.
Defendant had always told him that if they divorced, she would make their
two daughters hate him. Id. At one point, Jon spent a night at his parents' home,
1

Because this is an interlocutory appeal, this Statement of Facts is composed
of facts adduced at the preliminary hearing and proffered by the parties. Defendant
has not yet been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and thus retains the legal
presumption of innocence.
3

but that night, Defendant called his cell phone and had the girls scream into the
phone, "Daddy, Daddy, why did you do this? Why are you hurting us? Why are
you doing this to us?" R. 711: 94. Jon testified that "it broke me, and I couldn't do
that to my girls at that time." Id. He moved back in. Id. But he moved out for good
in November 2005, and the couple were divorced in July 2006. R. 711: 27-28.
After Jon moved out, Defendant would "constantly call [his] cell phone and
abuse [him]... [and] do her rants on [him]." R. 711: 99-100. She would call him at
all hours, wake him up, and call when she was drunk. R. 711: 100. He finally
terminated his cell phone service, and refused to give Defendant his new cell phone
number, even though "[s]he asked for it continuously." R. 711:100.
On 26 April 2006 Jon was working at the Principal Financial Group in
Woodland Towers in Salt Lake City. R. 711:28. Defendant came to his work shortly
after noon. R. 711: 31. Because she had harassed people at Jon's work in the past,
she was not allowed in the office. R. 711: 31. Jon went out front and informed
Defendant that she needed to leave, "because you've harassed employees here
before." R. 711: 31,101. She replied, "I don't have a protective order against me."
R. 711:101. He accompanied her to the elevator and out of the building. R. 711:32,
101.
Outside, they discussed a term of the divorce settlement, which was that she
would keep the home and all the equity in the home, but she had to get the home
4

put into her name by March 30. R. 711: 32. She wanted Jon to sign a quit claim
deed; he refused to do that until his name was taken off the two mortgages
encumbering the home. R. 711:32-33. She said that she was not refinancing the first
mortgage because the interest rates were good, and that he was going to have to pay
for it while she lived there. R. 711:102. He explained that he would not deliver a
quit claim deed to her until both liens were put in her name alone: "my attorney
told me, if you want, we can give you extra time; I'll sign a quit [claim] deed and
we'll put it in to trust, a n d . . . hold on to it until the loan was put in your name." R.
711: 34. Jon said, "you know, you need to actually make an effort here, too. I'm
reaching out; you need to reach out also." R. 711:102-03.
Defendant handed Jon her phone and he explained his position to a bank
officer on the phone. When he finished, he walked to her car and returned her
phone. R. 711: 33-34, 102. Defendant got "very aggressive," raising her voice,
swearing, and impugning Jon. R. 711: 34-35. She told him that his daughters did
not love him or want to see him anymore. Then she repeatedly played a song on
her car stereo called Angry John[ny]. R. 711: 36. The lyrics are something like,
"'Johnny, Johnny, angry Johnny; Jezebel, I want to kill you; I want to blow you
away.'" And whenever the singer sang the words, "I want to blow you away,"
Defendant would form her hands in the shape of a gun and point it at Jon's head. R.
711:37. She did this well over 30 times. R. 711:37. She said, "'say, isn't this a great
5

song? Isn't this great how songs can just motivate people? Wouldn't this be great if
it was a true song?'" R. 711:37-38. She also lip-synced the lyrics. R. 711:106.2
She stopped playing the song long enough to tell Jon that she needed money
for daycare. R. 711: 38. He agreed to pay the daycare provider, as the mediation
agreement required him to pay half of daycare expenses; however, she would not
tell him where the children were. Id. Finally she told him she would pay the entire
amount and said that their daughters "don't love you, don't want to talk to you,
don't want to see you." R. 711: 39. She also said that they referred to the man she
was dating as "Dad," and that she wanted to terminate Jon's parental rights so they
could have a dad. R. 711: 38. Jon testified that he would never do that: "My
daughters are my life." Id. "I will assure you," Defendant said, "you will never see
your girls again." R. 711: 39.
In the course of this conversation, Defendant referred to Jon's great-uncle
i

Darrell, who had recently died, saying, "I'm sorry to hear about Uncle Darrell." R.
711:103. And she mentioned that she had put their dog, Dutch, to sleep. R. 711:
105. They also spoke about Defendant's father. She said, "He takes me out shooting

2

The song is "Angry Johnny," a 1995 release by Poe. Here are some of the
lyrics: "Johnny, angry Johnny/This is Jezebel in He 11/1 wanna kill you/1 wanna
blow you away/I wanna kill you/I wanna blow you away." http://www.cmt.com/
lyrics/ poe/ angry-johnny/ 728580/lyrics.jhtml
6

guns a lot. Every time he teaches me how to shoot a gun, I think I'm shooting you/'
R. 711: 39.
Jon said he had to return to work. R. 711:39. Defendant's parting comment
was, "you are a parasite on this earth and I'm going to wipe you off this earth." R.
711:40.
"I knew she was going to kill me"
Jon went back to work, but he left at about 4:30 p.m. because he "was really
shaken up by what she had said that afternoon." R. 711:40,107. He walked out of
the building talking by phone to Tiffany Saltzman, his current wife. R. 711:109. As
he walked toward his car in a two-level parking area he heard tires squeal, then
heard a car accelerating extremely fast— "faster than [a car] should be underneath
covered parking"— and when he turned around he saw Defendant speeding
toward him in her Ford Explorer: "I could see that cold, evil expressionless look in
her face. I knew she was going to kill me." R. 711: 41-42. He jumped in between
two cars "in the nick of time." R. 711: 42, 111.
Jon jumped over a three-foot cement wall and ran back toward the building,
"yelling to people to call 911." R. 711:43. A co-worker said, "we already have." Id.
People were screaming. Id. Jon kept running toward what he thought would be the
relative safety of Woodland Towers. Id. As he got to the building, he turned
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around and saw Defendant speeding through the visitor parking area; people were
yelling, "get in the building." R. 711:44.
He entered the first set of doors, then the second set of doors, and "actually,
for a split second, had a sense of security," but "it wasn't even a full second." Id.
Defendant crashed her Ford Explorer through the building, hitting Jon and
knocking him about ten feet, leaving him dazed. Id. He remembered, as he hit the
ground, "thinking I was dead; T m not going to get out of this/" Id. But he got up
and ran. R. 711: 45. He headed down the middle corridor connecting the east
entrance with the west lobby: "I just ran for my life." Id. Defendant sped up and hit
him again, spinning him around on the ground. Id. He tried to keep running, but
he could not put any pressure on his left leg, so he hopped down a hallway, went
into a service room, and put his back up against the door, "just scared that she was
going to come in there." Id. He was "shaking, bleeding, and just praying to God
that [he could] live." R. 711: 45-46. About twenty minutes later, paramedics
arrived, stabilized him, and transported him to the hospital. R. 711: 51.
Jon suffered cuts and abrasions over his body, including cuts on both hands,
his chest, and the backs of his legs. R. 711:51-52. His ankle was shattered, requiring
three surgeries. R. 711:52. He was on crutches for over fifteen weeks. R. 711: 53.
He still experiences a lot of pain; he can no longer run or play football, basketball or
softball; walking is "very, very uncomfortable." R. 711: 58.
8

Jon has since moved to Iowa; he has not returned to work due to posttraumatic stress syndrome, for which he is seeing a counselor. R. 711:120.
Defendant's driving caused an estimated $50,000 to $100,000 worth of damage
to the office building. R. 711:19,24.
On 26 April 2006, Jon had a life insurance policy; Defendant was the named
beneficiary. R. 711: 59.
"The final straw that broke the camel's back"
Defense proffers. In her motion in limine seeking a jury instruction on
extreme emotional distress manslaughter, Defendant proffered additional facts
orally and in writing. These proffers included the following:
Approximately two years before the date of the offense, Jon viewed
pornography on their home computer, prompting a visit to the home by law
enforcement to investigate a possible child pornography violation. R. 443; R. 711:
76. Also, between two and three years before the date of the offense, Jon "forced"
Defendant to engage in a "sexual threesome" with one of his co-workers. R. 443; R.
711: 74-76. After Jon moved out of the house, Defendant discovered that he had
been having an affair. R. 443. He continued to see the woman throughout the
divorce process. R. 443-44.
About a month and a half after "a wonderful anniversary weekend," Jon
returned from a business trip where Tiffany Saltzman worked, and "over a very
9

short period of time/' he told Defendant that was moving out and seeking a divorce.
R. 711: 77. And he was "constantly text-messaging [Saltzman] on the cell phone/'
R. 711: 78. Also during this time, Jon was seeing less of their children and he began
to withdraw from participating with them. R. 446. He was also uncooperative in
coordinating visitation. R. 446.
When Defendant sought Jon's cell phone number "to try to have him have
contact with his daughters,... have an emergency number for him in the event that
something happened and they needed to get hold of him," he either denied that he
had a cell phone or "refused to give her the cell-phone number." R. 711:78. On the
date of the incident, Jon "came walking out of the building . . . talking on a cell
phone to the woman he was having... an extramarital affair with, with whom he is
now married." R. 711:75-76. This was for Defendant "the final straw that broke the
camel's back." R. 711: 78.
There were also factors "outside of" Jon. R. 711: 79. Defendant was seeing a
therapist, who had prescribed certain medication. R. 711: 79. Because she was no
longer covered by Jon's health insurance, she was relying on samples from the
therapist. R. 711: 79. Three weeks before the crime, Defendant's therapist died
unexpectedly, which "cut off medication, cut off therapy, cut off everything. And
three weeks later, we have this incident." R. 711: 79.

10

As a result of the divorce, Defendant was forced to work but still did not have
enough money to pay her bills. R. 444-48. A mediation agreement was "forced
down her throat" as a result of "[p]oor legal advice" and the fact that she was not
receiving any financial support from Jon. R. 444-45. Her lawyer obtained no
temporary orders. R. 445.
During this time, Jon was to provide health coverage for the family but on
two occasions he cancelled the coverage, causing a lapse in her ability to acquire
medication. R. 445.
"Defendant White was not crying, upset, or emotional"
Prosecution proffers. The prosecutor proffered facts in her memorandum
opposing Defendant's motion in limine. These proffers included the following:
After Defendant contacted the police in December 2005 to report her
suspicion that Jon had viewed and stored child pornography on their home
computer, the police reviewed the materials supplied by Defendant and found no
evidence of child pornography. R. 462.
Shortly after the attack, while still seated in the Explorer, Defendant called
Jon's sister and told her that she thought she had just killed Jon.

R. 460.

Defendant's "tone of voice was matter-of-fact and unemotional." R. 460. Deputy
Terry McQueen approached Defendant while she was still seated in the driver's seat
of the Explorer. Deputy McQueen observed that "Defendant White was not crying,
11

upset, or emotional." R. 460. Deputy McQueen also observed one empty
prescription medication bottle in the car and another in Defendant's purse. R. 460.
Defendant was taken to Cottonwood Hospital, released, and interviewed at
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office by Detective Brent Adamson. R. 460.
Defendant told Detective Adamson that she "got into a car accident" and drove
through a building because she "took too much medication." R. 460. She later told
the detective she was on Xanax, took Lexapro every other day, and had taken nine
Valium capsules before returning to Jon's work that afternoon. R. 460-61.3
When told she was under arrest for running over her spouse, Defendant
expressed confusion about how Jon could have been injured and said that he was
not even in front of her. R. 461. She recounted that she had gone to Jon's work at
about noon that day to ask for his help in obtaining a second mortgage and
described their conversation as "very decent." R. 461. Jon had asked how she was
doing and arranged to pick up the children that weekend. Id. Jon told her that he
was not going to sign anything, but to get the papers from the bank and he would
look them over. She told him that was "fine." Id. When she returned later that
afternoon and saw Jon in the parking lot, she called to him through her car window,
3

Potential side effects of Valium include unusual risk-taking, decreased
inhibitions, no fear of danger, depressed mood, suicidal thoughts, hyperactivity,
agitation, and hostility, http://www.drugs.com/valiiim.html.
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asking him to sign the papers, and explained that she "was just trying to chase him
to get the papers/ 7 Id. When Jon went inside the building, her "foot went on the
pedal and [she] went through a building, and the other side of the building stopped
[her] car." Id. She denied hitting Jon with the car. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly ruled that the evidence did not warrant instructing
the jury on Defendant's claimed defense of extreme emotional distress.
It is an affirmative defense to a charge of attempted murder that the
defendant attempted to cause the death of another under the influence of extreme
emotional distress for which there is an explanation or excuse that is reasonable
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the circumstances.
Here, however, the evidence of extreme emotional distress is so slight that all
reasonable people would reject it. Defendant points to evidence that her husband
was unfaithful, that he forced her to engage in a sexual threesome, that he viewed
pornography in the home, that he left her after a pleasant anniversary getaway, that
he was uncooperative in the course of their divorce proceedings, that he shirked his
parental responsibilities and hampered hers, and that she was financially strapped
and had trouble obtaining needed medications. When she saw him talking on a cell
phone he had earlier denied owning, according to the proffer, she snapped and
attempted to run him over.
13

These circumstances do not justify an instruction on extreme emotional
distress. They describe common frustrations that would not drive a reasonable
person into a homicidal frenzy. They are remote in time, occurring weeks or even
years earlier. They ignore the fact that Defendant explicitly threatened to kill Jon
four hours before the alleged attempt. Her claimed provocation—seeing him
talking on a cell phone—is negligible compared to the provocations described in
Utah manslaughter cases. Finally, according to Jon's account, the attack was cold
and calculated; according to Defendant's statement to police, it was an accident.
The instant case presents no facts similar to Utah manslaughter cases, such as
knife play or pistol-whipping. On the contrary, our courts have held that no
instruction is required where a heated argument is followed by a cooling-off period,
where jealousy over an ex-girlfriend complicated by child custody issues causes
hurt feelings, or where a family friend was ill-treated by her husband. The instant
case is similar to these.
To mitigate a charge of murder or attempted murder, a defendant's emotional
distress must be extreme. While the average reasonable person might under the
circumstances of this case have been so enraged as to write the victim an angry
letter, stalk him, slander him, or even strike him, she would not have been so
enraged as to attempt to kill him. Defendant's claim thus fails.

14

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A JURY INSTRUCTION ON EXTREME
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court erred in denying [her] motion in
limine to introduce the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress to the
jury." Br. Aplt. at 12 (capitalization, boldface, and underlining omitted).
In support of this claim, Defendant contends that the trial court made four
errors of law: (1) ruling that Defendant did not present sufficient evidence to justify
instructing the jury on extreme emotional distress; (2) failing to view the evidence
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then-existing circumstances;
(3) ruling that Defendant's stressors were "too remote in time and lacking a highly
provocative triggering event"; and (4) ruling that Defendant "did not lose selfcontrol, had a plan and was aware of what she was doing" at the time she allegedly
committed the crime. Br. Aplt. at 12-13.
Defendant's claim is based on the facts summarized in her brief, which, she
argues, are "more than sufficient evidence to meet the corrected standard of
presenting the case to the jury on the defense of extreme emotional distress." Br.
Aplt. at 11. She "insists there is ample basis in the evidence developed thus far, and
perhaps even additional evidence to be developed, to support her theory." Br. Aplt.
at 14.
15

Trial courts' ruling. The trial court ruled that "[t]he circumstances proffered
by Defendant White do not constitute extreme emotional distress, therefore there is
no rational basis in the evidence for the defendant's theory that she committed
Attempted Manslaughter rather than Attempted [Murder]." R. 651. The court ruled
that Defendant did not present "a sufficient quantum of evidence to warrant jury
instructions on the defense of extreme emotional distress." Id.
The court acknowledged that Defendant had cited "marital difficulties,
financial stress, difficulties with the divorce, and the death of Ms. Talbot [her
therapist who was providing medication samples] as stressors that accumulated
over time to create a situation wherein she lost self-control on the day of the
incident." Id. Nevertheless, the court ruled that it was "required to evaluate how
these stressors would impact the average reasonable person, and whether these
stressors would cause a reasonable person to experience a loss of self-control." Id.
Controlling law: manslaughter. Traditionally, manslaughter was viewed as a
lesser included offense of murder. Thus, in 1973, a homicide was deemed to be
manslaughter if the actor "[c]auses the death of another under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(b) (Allen Smith Co. 1973). At
that time, the statutory definition of "reasonableness" incorporated a subjective
component:
16

The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse of the actor...
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(c)(2) (Allen Smith Co. 1973) (emphasis added).
In 1985, the Legislature made three significant changes to the definition of
manslaughter. First, it excised the term mental from the phrase "extreme mental or
emotional disturbance," thereby rendering the phrase "extreme emotional
disturbance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1985). Second, it excluded "mental
illness" from the definition of "emotional disturbance." Id. Thirdly, and most
relevant here, it replaced the subjective test with an objective one: it specified that
the reasonableness of an actor's explanation for his extreme emotional disturbance
should be judged not from the viewpoint of a person in "the circumstances as he
believes them to be," but from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the actual
circumstances:
The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse . . . shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then
existing circumstances.
Id.
In 1999, the Legislature recast manslaughter as an "affirmative defense"
reducing a charge from murder to manslaughter or attempted murder to attempted
manslaughter. It also changed disturbance to distress:

17

It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted
murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to
cause the death of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse;...
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1999). In addition, while retaining the objective
definition of reasonableness and the exclusion for mental illness, the Legislature
added a second exclusion, declaring that "emotional distress does not include:...
distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct." Id. This is the
form of manslaughter that was in effect at the time of the instant charged offense
and in effect today.4
Thus, under Utah's statutory scheme, extreme emotional distress
manslaughter is no longer a lesser included offense to the crime of murder; it is an
"affirmative defense" reducing a charge of aggravated murder to murder, or a
charge of murder to manslaughter. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (4) (a) (i), -(d) (West
2000); State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, % 24. Its parameters are clear in the statute:
(1) the defendant acted "under the influence of extreme emotional
distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse";
(2) defendant's distress is not the result of "mental illness as defined in
section 76-2-305";
(3) defendant's distress is not "substantially caused by the defendant's
own conduct"; and
4

The section was renumbered in 2000. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2000).
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(4) the explanation or excuse for defendant's distress must be
reasonable "from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then
existing circumstances/'
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4) (West 2004).
Controlling law: affirmative defenses.

Unless otherwise provided by

statute, when a defendant presents evidence of an affirmative defense, the
prosecution must negate it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-502 (West 2004); Low, 2008 UT 58, f 46. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5 (West
2004) (tacitly placing the burden of establishing "special mitigation" by a
preponderance of the evidence on the proponent of special mitigation). This is a
statutory requirement, not a constitutional one. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977) (approving a statute placing upon the accused the burden to
establish by a preponderance of evidence that he acted under an extreme emotional
disturbance).
"When a criminal defendant requests a jury instruction regarding a particular
affirmative defense, the court is obligated to give the instruction if evidence has
been presented . . . that provides any reasonable basis upon which a jury could
conclude that the affirmative defense applies to the defendant." Low, 2008 UT 58, *f
25. However, a defendant is not entitled to an instruction if the evidence of extreme
emotional distress is "so slight that all reasonable people would have to conclude
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against the defendant on that point/' State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861,871 (Utah
1998) (citing State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33,34 (Utah 1988); State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d
70, 72-73, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (1969)). The court may even refuse to instruct on a
defense theory supported by a defendant's own testimony, if the "great weight of
the evidence... runs contrary to defendant's claim." State v. Kelt, 2002 UT106, ^f 24,
n. 5, K 25,61 P.3d 1019.
In determining whether the trial court correctly refused to instruct on a
claimed defense, the appellate court will view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defense. State v. Talarico, 57 Utah 229,193 P. 860,861 (Utah 1920).
Cf. State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, % 10,152 P.3d 315 ("When considering whether a
defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense jury instruction, we view the
evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to
the defense") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A. The court correctly viewed the evidence from the viewpoint of a
reasonable person.
Defendant claims that the trial court "omitted an important subjective
statutory perspective" and failed to view the evidence from the viewpoint of the
reasonable person under the then-existing circumstances when it ruled as a matter
of law that the proffered evidence "would not cause the average reasonable person
to suffer from extreme emotional distress." Br. Aplt. at 12.
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The court ruled that the "extreme emotional distress defense is available only
to defendants who have been subjected to stress that would cause the average
reasonable person to have an extreme emotional reaction and experience a loss of
self-control/7 R. 651. The court was therefore required to evaluate how Defendant's
marital difficulties and divorce, her financial stress, and the death of her therapist
"would impact the average reasonable person, and whether these stressors would
cause a reasonable person to experience a loss of self-control/' Id. The court ruled
that these stressors "do not rise to this level; they are common occurrences that are
endured by many people, and in this case do not justify the attempted homicide of
Jon White." R. 652. The court's ruling was correct.
Defendant, relying on an opinion from the New York Court of Appeals,
argues that the reasonableness assessment "'should be made by viewing the
subjective, internal situation in which the defendant found himself and the external
circumstances as he perceived them at the time, however inaccurate that perception
may have been." Br. Aplt. at 16-17 (quoting People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310,1316
(N.Y. 1980).
Defendant's reliance on People v. Casassa is misplaced. That opinion from the
New York Court of Appeals construes a New York statute declaring that the
reasonableness of an excuse "is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in
the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to
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be." Id. at 1315-16. This language is materially identical to the Utah manslaughter
statute prior to the 1985 amendment, which in fact Casassa cites. Id. at 1316. As
explained above, however, the 1985 amendment replaced this subjective aspect of
the statute with a purely objective standard.
Now the defense is available only to those who kill under the influence of
extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse:
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or
attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of another or
attempted to cause the death of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse;...
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4)(a)(i). The statute reiterates that "[t]he reasonableness
of an explanation or excuse . . . shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
reasonable person under the then existing circumstances/7 § 76-5-203(4)(c). In fact,
the term reasonable or its variant appears five times in subsection 76-5-203(4).
This reasonably explained distress, then, must be of sufficient intensity that it
would overwhelm the self-control of "the average reasonable person":
[A] person suffers from an extreme emotional disturbance "when he is
exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress" such that
the average reasonable person under that stress would have an
extreme emotional reaction to it, as a result of which he would
experience a loss of self-control and that person's reason would
be overborne by intense feelings such as passion, anger, distress,
grief, excessive agitation, or other similar emotions.
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State v. Shumway, 2002 UT124, U 9,63 R3d 94 (construing same standard in
lesser included offense context) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471
(Utah 1988) (opinion of Hall, C J., with one justice concurring on this point),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994)).5
The trial court thus correctly applied an objective, reasonable-person standard
in assessing whether there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the extreme
emotional distress Defendant claims to have been suffering at the time of the alleged
offense.

5

The question of which provocations are "reasonable" presupposes value
judgments about which types of homicides deserve a measure of lenity under law
and which do not. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the
Provocation Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331 (1997). Nourse argues that mitigation should
be reserved for only those killers who kill "with a rage shared by the law":
In every provoked murder case the laws risks the embrace of revenge.
To maintain its monopoly on violence, the State must condemn, at least
partially, those who take the law in their own hands. At the same time,
however, some provoked murder cases temper our feelings of revenge
with the recognition of tragedy. Some defendants who take the law in
their own hands respond with a rage shared by the law. In such cases,
we "understand" the defendant's emotions because these are the very
emotions to which the law itself appeals for the legitimacy of its own
use of violence. At the same time, we continue to condemn the act
because the defendant has claimed a right to use violence that is not his
own.
Id. at 1393. Defendant here did not "respond with a rage shared by the law."
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B. The trial court correctly ruled that Defendants stressors were too
remote in time and lacked a triggering event.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by ruling that Defendant's stressors
were "too remote in time and lacking a highly provocative triggering event." Br.
Aplt. at 12.
The court ruled that "[t]he reasonableness of these stressors as an adequate
excuse or explanation for a loss of self-control is further diminished by the length of
time between the stressors and the incident." R. 652. Here, several of Defendant's
stressors — the threesome, the pornography investigation, and the death of her
therapist—preceded the incident by "several weeks to years." R. 652. This delay
contrasts sharply, the court noted, with the supreme court's two most recent
extreme emotional distress cases, Shumway, 2002 UT124, and Spillers, 2007 UT13.
Again, the court's ruling was correct.
Shumway, a 15-year-old boy, killed his friend Chris with a butcher knife
during a sleepover at the friend's house. 2002 UT 124, ^f 2. An argument over a
videogame spiraled out of control when Chris, who had a reputation for being a
"hothead" and losing his temper, retrieved a knife and lunged at the Shumway. Id.
Evidence suggested that Shumway had endured years of bullying by his peers, and
that "all of this 'came out on Chris' when the boys fought over the knife." Id. The
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supreme court ruled that Shumway was entitled to an extreme emotional distress
instruction. 2002 UT124, H 13.
Spillers and his friend Bo argued, Bo accusing Spillers of having "snitchjed]"
on him to drug enforcement agents. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, % 3. According to Spillers,
Bo, who had a reputation for violence, retrieved a firearm and struck Spillers on the
back of the head, a blow that left him "cloudy, dazed, uncomfortable, and scared."
Id. Bo then approached him "with his arm cocked to strike again." Id. Spillersthen
shot him dead. Id. The supreme court ruled that Spillers was entitled to an extreme
emotional distress instruction. 2007 UT 13, % 20.
The case at bar presents nothing remotely comparable to what Shumway and
Spillers faced. Shumway alleged that Christopher lunged at him with a kitchen
knife; Spillers alleged that Bo clubbed him over the head with a gun; Defendant
alleges that Jon talked on a cell phone. Common experience teaches that, while the
rational faculties of an "average reasonable person" might be overborne by intense
feelings such as passion or anger by aggressive knife play or pistol-whipping, the
same is not true of seeing someone talking on a cell phone. Shumway, 2002 UT 124,
II 9. Lumping the three into the single category of "initiating incident[s]," as
Defendant does, blurs crucial differences in magnitude. Br. Aplt. at 22.
Again relying on Jsfew York precedent, Defendant argues that the inquiry is
not whether a killing (or in this case, an attempted killing) was reasonable, but
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whether the defendant's explanation for her extreme emotional reaction is
reasonable. Br. Aplt. at 17 (quoting People v. Liebman, 583 N.Y.S.2d 234, 241 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992). The law in Utah is similar. A prosecutor's statement that "the jury
had to find a reasonable justification for the killing rather than a reasonable
justification for appellant's extreme emotional disturbance" was deemed by this
Court to be "clearly a misstatement of the law." State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39,45 (Utah
App. 1990).
Nevertheless, Defendant's argument fails. The reasonableness inquiry cannot
be plucked from its context. Defendant asserts extreme emotional distress as a
defense to a charge of attempted murder. "[T]he plain intent of our statutory
scheme is to mitigate the crime of murder where a defendant's conduct was clearly
wrong but where the circumstances were so provocative that even a reasonable
person might have reacted similarly." Shumway, 2002 UT124, \ 12 (stating, without
criticism, the State's argument). The question is not whether the average reasonable
person might, under the then-existing circumstances, have been so enraged as to
write the victim an angry letter, stalk him, slander him, or even strike him. It is
whether the average reasonable person might, under the then-existing
circumstances, have been so enraged as to kill him. Any lesser showing is logically
insufficient to mitigate a charge of murder.
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Attempted murder is an extreme act. Extreme actions are partially excused
under the law only by extreme emotional distress, which must in turn be explained
or excused by extreme provocations. The flaw in Defendant's claim is that her
alleged extreme emotional distress rests on common provocations.

As the

prosecutor argued below, most people have endured stressful times with their
spouses or parents, as well as financial stress. R. 711:82. Adultery, divorce, deceit,
mental health issues, and financial stress are, unfortunately, common, not extreme.
Finally, implicit in the trial court's ruling here is an acknowledgement that an
emotional disturbance may be defused by a cooling-off period. State v. Clayton, 658
P.2d 624 (Utah 1983), demonstrates this. After a Provo bar fight, Clayton went
home, retrieved a gun, and, about twenty minutes after leaving the bar, returned to
it, argued with the victim, then shot and killed him. Id. at 625. The supreme court
had little trouble affirming the trial court's refusal to instruct on extreme emotional
disturbance. "The passage of time between the fight and defendant's return to the
bar tends to negate the 'heat of passion' explanation," it wrote. Id. at 626.6
"Further, defendant testified that in returning to the bar he acted purposefully with

6

The "extreme emotional disturbance" standard "reformulates and enlarges"
the earlier "heat-of-passion standard to include any extreme emotional disturbance
based on a reasonable excuse or explanation that mitigates the blameworthiness of
the homicide." State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254,259 (Utah 1988).
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the stated intent of collecting from the victim the title to his car and some money
owed him/ 7 Id.
The supreme court held that Clayton's 20-minute cooling off period tended to
negate a heat-of-passion defense; Defendant here had a cooling off period of about
four hours. R. 711: 31, 40. Like Clayton, Defendant returned to the scene of an
argument (according to Jon's testimony) or a discussion (according to Defendant's
statement to police) with a purpose related to a property dispute. Clayton also
demonstrates that the trial court was correct in discounting Defendant's principal
stressors on the ground that they preceded the incident by "several weeks to years."
R. 652.
The point of these cases is not that a defendant's personal history can never
contribute to a finding of extreme emotional distress—after all, the court cited
Shumway's history of being bullied in ruling that he was entitled to a manslaughter
instruction. But the cases demonstrate that personal history must be coupled with,
and play a supporting role to, some proximate, highly provocative event. In
Shumway's case, that was a physical struggle coupled with his victim's knife play.
No Utah case holds that anything so slight as seeing an ex-spouse talking on a cell
phone, coupled with various common frustrations experienced over the previous
two to three years, reasonably explains or excuses emotional distress sufficiently
extreme to mitigate an attempted murder.
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C. The trial court correctly ruled that Defendant did not in fact lose
self-control.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that Defendant "did not
lose self-control, had a plan and was aware of what she was doing" at the time she
allegedly committed the crime. Br. Aplt. at 13.
The court observed in the motion hearing, that from "a reasonable person's
point of view, this almost looks to me like she planned it." R. 714:15. The court
later concluded that" [t]he circumstances of the crime itself indicate that Defendant
White had not lost self-control at the time of the incident, but appeared to be acting
in accordance with a plan." R. 652. The court cited the fact that the disagreement
over the quit-claim deed preceded the incident by more than four hours, and that
Defendant negotiated a "complicated driving pattern" in her pursuit of Jon White.
Id. These factors indicate that Defendant "was aware of what she was doing and
was in control of her faculties during the time in question." Id.
The extreme emotional distress defense has a subjective prong and an
objective prong. The subjective prong is that the actor must have acted "under the
influence of extreme emotional distress." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (3)(a)(i);
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 871 (error in instructions mandating order of deliberation
harmless where record did not show that the defendant's alleged dislike of victim
"suddenly overwhelmed [his] self-control and caused him to kill the victim"); 2
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Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, § 7.10(a), (c) (1986)
(voluntary manslaughter as result of "reasonably induced emotional disturbance"
requires that "[t]he defendant must have been in fact provoked").
The objective prong is that there must be "a reasonable explanation or excuse"
for defendant's extreme emotional distress "from the viewpoint of a reasonable
person under the then existing circumstances." Utah, Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4).
To qualify for the defense, a defendant must adduce credible evidence of both
prongs. It is not sufficient that Defendant experienced an extreme emotional
disturbance if an average reasonable person would not have. But neither is it
sufficient that an average reasonable person would have experienced an extreme
emotional disturbance if Defendant in fact did not.
Here, the incontroverted evidence presented and proffered in the district
court supports the court's observation that Defendant did not lose self-control. She
confronted Jon at noon and they discussed the quit claim deed. But then she
repeatedly played Angry Johnny on her car stereo, lip-syncing the lyrics and making
shooting gestures. R. 711: 36-37,106. She said, "Wouldn't this be great if it was a
true song?" R. 711: 37-38. She referred to Jon's great-uncle Darrell, who had
recently died. R. 711:103. She mentioned that she had put their dog to sleep. R.
711: 105. She remarked that whenever she goes shooting, "I think I'm shooting
you." R. 711:39. And she ended their conversation with an explicit threat "you are
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a parasite on this earth and I'm going to wipe you off this earth." R. 711:40. This is
powerful evidence of a planned attack; rarely does such explicit evidence of intent
to kill come from the killer's own mouth. And these statements were made four
hours before Defendant's claimed provocation.
As to their next encounter, Jon's version of events and Defendant's version of
events diverge. According to Defendant's statement to police, the incident was an
accident. She left Jon's place of work, went home, and took nine Valium capsules.
R. 460-61. When she returned that afternoon and saw Jon in the parking lot, she
called to him through her car window, asking him to sign the papers, and explained
that she "was just trying to chase him to get the papers." R. 461. When Jon went
inside the building, her "foot went on the pedal and [she] went through a building,
and the other side of the building stopped [her] car." Id.
Jon's testimony, on the other hand, described a premeditated attack. He
heard Defendant's tires squeal, saw her Ford Explorer speeding toward him, and
saw a "cold, evil expressionless look in her face." R. 711: 42. He jumped between
two cars "in the nick of time." R. 711:42, 111. He hopped a three-foot cement wall
and kept running toward what he thought would be the relative safety of Woodland
Towers. R. 711: 43. Right after he entered the building, Defendant crashed her
vehicle through the building, hitting Jon and knocking him about ten feet, leaving
him dazed. R. 711:44. As he got up and "ran for [his] life," Defendant chased him
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down the middle corridor connecting the east entrance with the west lobby and hit
him again. R. 711: 45.
Neither version of the facts describes Defendant as in fact suffering extreme
emotional distress. Accordingly, the court was justified in concluding that, from "a
reasonable person's point of view, this almost looks... like she planned it/7 R. 714:
15. But, again, even if Defendant in fact suffered extreme emotional distress, she is
nevertheless not entitled to a jury instruction on that defense unless an average
reasonable person under the existing circumstances would also have that reaction.
D. The court properly ruled that the evidence did not justify a jury
instruction on extreme emotional distress.
Finally, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that she did not
present sufficient evidence to justify instructing the jury on extreme emotional
distress. Br. Aplt. at 12. This claim in effect summarizes Defendant's entire
position: the testimony presented and proffered below was sufficient to warrant a
jury instruction on extreme emotional distress.
A review of the relevant precedents here demonstrates convincingly that the
facts of this case are insufficient to warrant an extreme emotional distress
instruction.
Instruction required. The salient cases in which Utah courts have required a
jury instruction on extreme emotional distress (or disturbance) are Shumway and
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Spillers, discussed above. Briefly, Shumway, a 15-year-old boy with a history of
being bullied at school, killed his friend Chris after Chris lunged at him with a knife.
Shumway, 2002 UT 124, % 10. Spillers killed his friend Bo during an argument in
which Bo retrieved a firearm and struck Spillers on the back of the head, a blow that
left him "cloudy, dazed, uncomfortable, and scared/' Spillers, 2007 UT 13, Tf 20.
The case at bar presents no provocation remotely comparable to what
Shumway and Spillers experienced.
Instruction not required. The instant case more closely resembles Clayton.
Twenty minutes after a bar fight, Clayton returned with a gun for the purpose of
obtaining a car title and a loan repayment. He shot and killed the victim. The
supreme court ruled that the "passage of time between the fight and defendant's
return to the bar tends to negate the 'heat of passion' explanation." Clayton, 658
P.2d 626.
Like Clayton, Defendant returned to the scene of an earlier confrontation
about a property title, but she did so after a four-hour cooling off period rather than
a 20-minute one. Also, her weapon of choice was a Ford Explorer rather than a gun.
But in both cases, the cooling-off period undermines the claim that Defendant acted
under extreme emotional distress.
In Piansiaksone, the supreme court saw "no basis in the evidence to support
the view that Piansiaksone killed the victim as the result of an extreme emotional
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disturbance/' 954P.2dat871. Piansiaksone was told by Nuk, someone he respected
as an older brother, that the victim was beating Nuk's sister and 'disrespecting his
family." The court found "conspicuously absent" any evidence that "Nuk worked
Piansiaksone into a frenzy." Id. It found no basis for concluding that anything
"suddenly overwhelmed Piansiaksone's self-control and caused him to kill the
victim." Id.
The very factors the supreme court found "conspicuously absent" in
Piansiaksone's defense are also absent here. The instant record contains no evidence
that Jon or anyone else "worked [Defendant] into a frenzy," or even that she was in
a frenzy. Id. In addition, Defendant can point to no provocation reasonably able to
suddenly overwhelm her self-control and cause her to attempt to kill the victim.
In State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256,263 (Utah App. 1995), this court concluded that
the record was "devoid" of any evidence of extreme emotional distress. Price shot
his ex-girlfriend. Earlier in the evening she went out with another man, leaving
their child in the care of a friend. When Price asked to pick the child up, the friend
refused. Later that evening Price confronted the ex-girlfriend and became frustrated
when she "just ran off at the mouth" and "hurt his feelings." Id. at 258,263. When
apprehended, Price was "crying and visibly shaken." Id. at 258. This court held
that frustration and hurt feelings do not rise to the level of extreme emotional
disturbance. Id. at 263. Like Price, Defendant here points to domestic frustrations to
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justify her claim of extreme emotional distress. She claims more of a history of
frustration than Price apparently did, but no greater immediate provocation.
The trial court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, even viewing the
presented and proffered evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, that
evidence is "so slight that all reasonable people would have to conclude against the
defendant on that point/' Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 871.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the ruling of the district
court.
Respectfully submitted September 2,2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Screened by: A. Cook
Assigned to: A. Cook (Thursday)
DAO # 06007842
BAIL: $500,000
Warrant/Release: IN JAIL

-vsBRENDA CHRISTINE WHITE
DOB 11/19/75,
AKA BRENDA CROSSLEY
6134 So. Karos Cir.
Taylorsville, UT
529-17-0241
OTN 16816258
SO# 296951

AMENDED
DOMESTIC V I O L E N C E
INFORMATION

Case No. 061902834FS
Judge Robin W. Reese

Defendant.

The undersigned under oath states on information and belief that the defendant
committed the crimes of:
COUNTI
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER (DOMESTIC VIOLENCE), a First Degree
Felony, at 4021 South 700 East, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about April 26,
2006, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, BRENDA CHRISTINE WHITE, a party to the offense,
attempted to intentionally cause the death of Jon White, and Jon White or another
suffered serious bodily injury in the course of the defendant's commission of the offense.
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COUNT H
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Second Degree Felony, at 4021 South 700 East, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on or about April 26,2006, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 106,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, BRENDA CHRISTINE
WHITE, a party to the offense, intentionally damaged, defaced, or destroyed the
property of Woodland HI Holdings, LLC, causing a pecuniary loss to Woodland HI
Holdings, LLC equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
B. Adamson, J. White, T. White, C. Low, N. White, L. Haun, M. Henry, B. Zimmerman,
A. Low, J. Hansen, H. Scott, A. Sommer, M. Kime, J. Walker, L. Davies, M. Jones, E.
Nance, S. Luker, S. Bray

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases probable cause on the following:
The statement of Jon White that he and the defendant, Brenda C. White, are married but
are obtaining a divorce. On April 26, 2006, the defendant came to Mr. White's place of work,
located in the Woodland Towers at 4021 South 700 East in Salt Lake County, Utah, in a green
Ford Explorer. The defendant spoke to Mr. White while she was seated in her vehicle in the
parking lot and requested that Mr. White sign various papers. Mr. White refused to sign the
papers, and the defendant played a song on her car stereo that included the lyrics, "Johnny, I'm
gonna blow you away." The defendant also stated that her father had been teaching her how to
shoot a gun. Mr. White left the parking lot and returned to work.
Mr. Whitefinishedwork later that afternoon and walked toward his vehicle. Mr. White
heard the sound of squealing tires and saw the defendant driving toward him. The defendant
drove over the raised curb of the parking structure and chased Mr. White through the parking lot
as he ran toward the Woodland Towers. Mr. White entered the east side of the building through
a double set of glass doors. Mr. White continued to run through the building to a lobby on the
west side. The defendant drove her vehicle through the glass doors and down a hallway to the
lobby. The defendant struck Mr. White with the Explorer, causing Mr. White to flip over the
vehicle and fall to the ground. The defendant drove through the lobby windows and stopped her
vehicle. The defendant put her vehicle in reverse and backed into the lobby. Mr. White stood up

AMENDED INFORMATION
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and fled down a side hallway. The defendant turned her car around in the lobby and stopped the
vehicle.
Mr. White received several cuts and abrasion to his hands, legs, arms, and face. Mr.
White's ankle was dislocated.
The statement of Rick Johnson, employed by Wasatch Property Management, that the
defendant caused approximately $40,000 worth of damage to the Woodland Towers building.

^ . llULB. ADAMSON

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^2.
day of January, 2007.
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LOHRA L. MILLER, District Attorney
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DeputjyjHstrict Attorney
April 28,2006
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
Regarding Defendant's
Motion in Limine re Extreme
Emotional Distress

BRENDA CHRISTINE WHITE
Case No. 061902834
Defendant.
Hon. WILLIAM W. BARRETT

This matter came before the Court on October 19 ,2007, for a hearing regarding
the Defendant's Motion in Limine concerning the defense of Extreme Emotional
Distress. The Defendant was present and represented by counsel, Jason Schatz. The State
was represented by Alicia H. Cook and Stephen L. Nelson. The Court has received and
reviewed Defendant's Motion in Limine re Extreme Emotional Distress and supporting
memorandum, and the State's Reply. The Court heard oral argumentfromboth parties
concerning the motion on October 19th, 2007.
Having fully considered the memoranda and arguments of counsel, and for good
cause shown, the Court now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
The victim in this case, Jon White, was married to Defendant White for eleven
years before he left the marital home in November of 2005 and initiated divorce
proceedings.
Mr. White worked for the Principal Financial Group in the Woodland Towers
building, located at 4021 South 700 East, which is where he was employed on the
day of the incident, April 26th, 2006. On that date, Defendant White went to Mr.
White's place of work during the lunch hour and asked Mr. White to sign a quitclaim deed to the marital home. Mr. White refused to sign and returned to work.
At approximately 4:30 p.m., Mr. White left the Woodland Towers building and was
walking toward his car in a covered parking area when he heard the sound of
squealing tires. Mr. White saw Defendant White speeding toward him in her Ford
Explorer, and jumped between two parked cars. Mr. White jumped over a threefoot cement wall at the end of the covered parking structure, and ran through a
visitor parking lot back toward the Woodland Towers building. As Mr. White
approached the east entrance of the building, he turned and saw Defendant White
speeding through the visitor parking lot after him. Defendant White drove up onto
the sidewalk leading from the parking lot to the building, and turned the Explorer
toward the building. Mr. White ran through the first set of doors at the east
entrance, and Defendant White drove the Explorer through the glass doors.
Defendant White struck Mr. White with the Explorer and threw him back
approximately ten feet. Mr. White picked himself up off the ground and ran down a
corridor to the west lobby on the opposite side of the building. Defendant White
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chased Mr. White down the hallway and hit him with her vehicle a second time in
the west lobby. Mr. White flew over the hood of the Explorer and landed on the
ground. Mr. White stood to run away, but was unable to put any pressure on his left
leg. Mr. White hobbled down a smaller hallway until he found a service closet, and
hid there until he was discovered by a maintenance worker. Defendant White,
meanwhile, drove her vehicle entirely through the glass windows of the west lobby,
then reversed her vehicle back into the building and across the lobby. Defendant
White pulled forward again and stopped her vehicle in the middle of the lobby. The
incident was first reported to the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office at 4:39 p.m..
In the defendant's motion in limine, Defendant White proffered the evidence that
she argued constituted a basis for extreme emotional distress. In summary, the
defendant proffered that Jon White forced Defendant White to engage in a
"threesome" with a co-worker, that Jon White viewed pornography and was
investigated for possession of child pornography, and that Defendant White
discovered that Mr. White was engaged in an extra-marital affair prior to their
separation. Defendant White also proffered that she was financially stressed after
the separation, that Jon White only spent the minimum visitation time with their
children, that Mr. White made the visitation schedule difficult, that Mr. White
denied owning a cell phone, and that Mr. White promised to assist her with
refinancing the marital home, but refused to cooperate in the refinance process.
Defendant White was also being supplied with medications by a nurse practitioner
named Valerie Talbot who died on March 20th, 2006, due to the fact that Mr. White
had cancelled the defendant from his insurance policy. The Court does not make
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any findings of fact concerning the proffered evidence because the Court does not
weigh the credibility of the evidence for purposes of this motion, f State v. Kruger,
6P.3d 1116,1119 (Ut S.Ct. 2000).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The defense of extreme emotional distress is not applicable to Defendant White's
case. The circumstances proffered by Defendant White do not constitute extreme
emotional distress, therefore there is no rational basis in the evidence for the
defendant's theory that she committed Attempted Manslaughter rather than
Attempted Homicide. Accordingly, the defendant has not presented a sufficient
quantum of evidence to warrant jury instructions on the defense of extreme
emotional distress and the lesser included offense of Attempted Manslaughter.
The factors proffered by Defendant White do not meet the definition of "extremely
unusual and overwhelming stress" given in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,471 (Ut.
S.Ct. 1988). The extreme emotional distress defense is available only to defendants
who have been subjected to stress that would cause the average reasonable person
to have an extreme emotional reaction and experience a loss of self-control.
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 471. Defendant White cites marital difficulties, financial stress,
difficulties with the divorce, and the death of Ms. Talbot as stressors that
accumulated over time to create a situation wherein she lost self-control on the day
of the incident. The Court, however, is required to evaluate how these stressors
would impact the average reasonable person, and whether these stressors would
cause a reasonable person to experience a loss of self-control. The stressors cited
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by Defendant White do not rise to this level; they are common occurrences that are
endured by many people, and in this case do not justify the attempted homicide of
Jon White.
The reasonableness of these stressors as an adequate excuse or explanation for a
loss of self-control is further diminished by the length of time between the stressors
and the incident. Several of the stressors that Defendant White proffers (the
threesome, the pornography investigation, and the death of Ms. Talbot) occurred
several weeks to years before April 26 , 2006. Furthermore, the Court has
reviewed the two most recent decisions of the Utah appellate courts dealing with
extreme emotional distress, and has noted that in both cases a highly provocative
event occurred immediately before the crime, f State v. Shumwav, 3 P.3d 94; State
v. Spillers, 152 P.2d 315 (Ut. S.Ct. 2007). In the case at bar, there is a complete
absence of a similarly provocative event on or near the day in question.
The circumstances of the crime itself indicate that Defendant White had not lost
self-control at the time of the incident, but appeared to be acting in accordance with
a plan. The disagreement about the quit-claim deed occurred during the noon hour,
and the crime occurred more than four hours later at approximately 4:30, when Mr.
White was walking across the parking lot toward his vehicle. The complicated
driving pattern that Defendant White negotiated to pursue Mr. White also indicates
that Defendant White was aware of what she was doing and was in control of her
faculties during the time in question.
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ORDER

Defendant White's Motion in Limine regarding Extreme Emotional Distress is
denied. The information that Defendant White has proffered does not constitute evidence
of extreme emotional distress, and therefore is irrelevant to that defense and may not be
presented as evidence of extreme emotional distress.

Dated this

j> day of

2007.

By the Court:

WILLIAM W. BJ
Third District Court'5^^^S^t^f
Approved as to form:

Jason Schatz
Counsel for Defendant
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